By Chris Odinaka Nwedo
This article was written long ago. The situations referenced here may have changed.
The antagonisms between Lebanon and Syria resulted in the strategic destabilization of the country by Syrians using all sorts of proxies, including militants. Fatah al-Islam was formed by Syria from Fatah al-Intifada’s remnants after it pulled its army out of Lebanon in April 2005. The group is largely isolated from the other Palestinian factions. Fatah al-Islam holds fast to Salafist doctrine and includes large numbers of jihadists from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, and even Bangladesh. Fatah al-Islam’s cadres are believed to number around two hundred and eighty fighters and receive their munitions and new recruits from Syria.¹
There is a popular assumption that, ‘the expansion of Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared camp led to a serious power struggle among the Palestinians in Lebanon, most of whom are not at all happy to see this new organization under Syria’s direction challenging them.’² The revelation that the leadership of Fatah al-Islam at the time, Shaker Abssi, had links with al-Qaida leadership in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, now deceased, intensified the repugnance and determination to expunge the group in the camps by all manners of violence. ‘Along with al-Zarqawi, Abssi was sentenced to death in Jordan for suspected involvement in the 2002 killing of a US diplomat in Amman. He served a three-year jail sentence in Syria and then moved into Nahr al-Bared to set up Fatah al-Islam. It appears Damascus helped facilitate Abssi’s new base of operations and has used him as a point-man to manage the group’s activities.’³
It is speculated that the forceful takeover of Palestinian camps in Lebanon by Fatah al-Islam could not have been possible without significant patronage by the Syrian government and intelligence officers in the region. These fundamentalist groups ‘are used more as mercenaries than as militants motivated purely by ideology. In fact, Fatah al-Islam is of use to Syria in a variety of ways. The Alawite-Baathist regime in Damascus has long been adept at fuelling different shades of militants across its borders and using militant proxies in Lebanon for its own political aims, regardless of religious, ideological, or political orientations.’⁴ It is widely believed that Syrian intelligence and security forces in the region also facilitated the movement of countless jihadist-oriented militants into Lebanon. This became ‘most apparent with the surfacing of Fatah al-Islam in November 2006.’ Syrian intelligence also facilitated the entry of an Islamic fundamentalist named Khalid Najjar into Lebanon. Najjar allegedly was on ‘a mission on behalf of Syrian military intelligence to facilitate the arrival of Fatah al-Islam recruits from the Yarmuk refugee camp in Damascus to the Nahr al-Bared camp in Northern Lebanon.’⁵ Some analysts opined that, ‘Syrian cooperation in funneling Sunni militants across its borders helps Damascus keep jihadist attention off the Alawite-Baathist regime in Damascus. Syria’s militant management skill appeared to have paid off thus far in the eyes of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, but very well could end up creating a bigger militant threat for Damascus to deal with down the road.’⁶
Hezbollah groups in Lebanon are by and large believed to be potent arms of Iran and Syria in the determination to control the country and maintain it in unwavering subservience. ‘Though Syria’s Alawite rulers are more ideologically in tune with Hezbollah than the Palestinian factions are, the Syrian government understands that Hezbollah has its own political considerations and so Damascus cannot always rely on the Shiite militant groups to carry out all its politically motivated attacks in Lebanon. A Palestinian faction such as Fatah al-Islam is seen as a more dependable insurance policy for Damascus, and better suited for this type of militant activity. Many of Fatah al-Islam’s cadres have been waiting to go and fight in Iraq but have been kept in Nahr al-Bared by their handlers, thus giving Syria substantial control over how it negotiates with the United States regarding its “commitment” to crack down on the flow of insurgents. It is believed that Fatah al-Islam members also had been trained to carry out attacks against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon should the need arise for Syria to aid Hezbollah in flushing out obstacles to Hezbollah’s operations in the south.’⁷
The detrimental pressures of external forces in Lebanon recurrently manifest in ferocious murder cases, assassinations, and spates of violence rocking the country. Damascus is repeatedly held responsible for the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. The former Prime Minister represented one of the strongest sources of antagonism to the violence and destabilizing influence of Damascus in Lebanon. ‘The continuous violence in Nahr al-Bared, car bombings in predominantly Christian areas in Beirut, and in Verdun, a predominantly Sunni district in the West of Beirut,’ signify the determination of the potent forces of destabilization to constantly swing the country from bad to worse, to generate unrest, escalate reprisal violence, and eventually undermine Beirut’s administration.’⁸ Analysts ‘have little doubt that the bombings and the uptick in military activity were linked to Fatah al-Islam’s role as a tool for Syria to demonstrate to its opponents in the Lebanese government the too-high cost of having former president Siniora get the UN Security Council to unilaterally establish an international tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. Because principal members of the Syrian regime were most likely to be indicted in the assassination, forces were rallied to forestall meaningful cooperation with the UN in disentangling limitless tie-ups behind the killing. As an illustration, ‘the Lebanese opposition, led by Syria’s allies in the Shiite Hezbollah and Amal movements, blocked a tribunal decision in the Lebanese parliament by mass protest, but Siniora had placed the issue squarely in the hands of the United Nations.’⁹
The efforts by the Syrians to destabilize Lebanon and make it conflict-prone and ungovernable partly succeeded because the stories of Lebanon then were chronicles of conflicts, violence, deadly assaults, and deaths. Lebanon was not alone in the misfortune. Syria had a hand in pulling the strings of violent conflicts in Palestine, Iraq, and other surrounding states, with profound difficulties in containing the rapidly spreading culture of violence and religious fundamentalism in the Middle East. Unfortunately and regrettably, Syria unconsciously ran into dangerous traps it had perfected to completely ruin states. Today, Syria is an epicenter of violence in the Arab world. Syria is in ruin, and Damascus is a grisly sight, a ghost of its former self. At the time of writing, the civil war in Syria is active, intense, and without truce. Tens of thousands of Syrians have died, and probably more are living with permanent physical and psychological injuries due to the devastation of the civil war. Currently, millions of Syrians are living as refugees almost all over the world. Millions of Syrians live as refugees and beggars in Lebanon, a country they once intensely sought to protect but which they now find inhospitable.
Iraq and Iran, for many decades, were entangled in relentless hostilities. The ‘easy’ war and mutual destruction were facilitated by a steady supply of funds from oil wealth, which the countries were fortunate to have as backups for atrocities. At present, overt expressions of the perennial conflicts appear subdued in the wake of the bigger war in Iraq and the unavoidable absence of Saddam Hussein, one of the principal figures in the inflexible brutality. In the larger picture, the Iran-Iraq wars are lucid expressions and extensions of regular fratricides between extremist Shia and Sunni Arabs. In the subtle continuation of the war through covert means, Iran is accused of arming and inspiring Shiite radicals and militias in Iraq in targeted killings, destruction of mosques, suicide bombings, and various terror-linked activities. Iran seeks undisputed influence in the now humiliated Iraq for major regional roles and particularly in empowering the Shiite majority against the Sunni minority.
According to Ekaterina Stepanova (2008), ‘sectarian strife remains the form of inter-communal violence in Iraq in 2007. Sectarian violence had not been prevalent at the earlier stages of the invasion by U.S.-led allied troops but intensified following mass-casualty terrorist attacks against Shia targets that were blamed on Sunni insurgents, especially after the bombing of a Shia shrine in Samarra’s Golden Mosque in February 2006.’¹⁰ In further escalation of the violence, ‘Shia sectarian violence combined reprisal attacks by pro-government militias against Sunni insurgents with one-sided violence against Sunni civilians. Sectarian violence on both sides mainly took the forms of sectarian cleansing, that is, killing members of one sectarian group or driving them out of a community, and revenge attacks by squads affiliated with either Sunni or Shia militias, rather than involving larger populations or mass violence. Areas with fixed populations, such as Baghdad, the northern city of Tel Afar, and Diyala governorate, were the worst affected.’¹¹ The United States Government’s Accountability Office notes that, ‘the estimates of the dynamics of sectarian violence were complicated by the difficulty of establishing whether the perpetrators’ intents were sectarian in nature.’¹² Thousands of ethnic Kurds in northern Iraq were destroyed in their villages with chemical weapons under former ruler Saddam Hussein in what was described as one of the most reprehensible acts of bestiality by a ruler.
In reality, religion is a major active driving force in practically all of the violence in the Middle East. This is because of the robust importance of religion in the region. Some studies believe that Middle Eastern conflicts are both frequent and intense, and religious factors particularly exacerbate ethnic crises. The recurrent conflicts are traced to ever-present incidences of religious discrimination and political behaviors influenced by religious differences in the region. The unique impact of religion in the Arab world makes most of the conflicts it inspires more pronounced and intractable. All known violent or militant groups have names of religious coinage. Generally, ‘the diversity of violence reflects the range of motivations, identities, and level of activity of armed actors. Predatory groups that engage in criminal violence and exploit opportunities offered by the war economy continue to proliferate in conflict zones. Increasingly, states engaged in counter-insurgency are trying to mount symmetrical responses to symmetrical challenges from non-state actors relying on paramilitary groups, including ethnic, sectarian, or tribal militias.’¹³
However, in the African context, some strife-ridden ideological propensities and socio-cultural and religious eccentricities methodically incite one community against another. It is not unusual to see one religious group overwhelmed with hatred of the other or emblems denigrating the belief systems of neighbours. It is detestable that some seemingly violent religious leaders overtly extol injustice, violence, and oppression. It is easy to see these violent predispositions adapted in the interpretation of religious messages. The products of these daredevils have remained the tragedy of many African states. Religious totalitarians constantly spark conflicts and serious violence, ensuring that heads roll and pain and sorrow reign. The rapidly intensifying war in Yemen is fueled by Iran and Saudi Arabia. The perennial conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran has its origin in Islam. Interpretation of the demands of Islam is the foundation of mortal enmity between Shia and Sunni Muslims. In the fight to completely decimate one another, both Sunni and Shia Islamists claim inspiration from the same Allah. It seems that the war-mongers and lords of war in these enclaves are not different from the leaders of the religious faith. All the comparatively small states and small economies in the Arab world have their frequent wars subsidized by their bigger neighbors. The wars of absolute destruction in Yemen are bound to continue until the bigger powers consider violence as something vicious.
In Nigeria, religion-instigated violence is progressively taking a turn for the worse. This is substantially prejudicial to the stability and progress of this heterogeneous nation with an exploding population. Today, more time and resources are wasted in futile attempts to perfect strategies to avert imminent attacks by religious fundamentalists than addressing critical development needs. The Nigerian economy is robust and generates enough wealth for every Nigerian, but deep-rooted corruption and mismanagement proliferate, protract abject poverty, and prevent the development of basic infrastructure. The situation is now compounded by the need to allocate resources to confront Taliban-style refractory Islamists invading the country from the northern horizon.
There is no real possibility of differentiating the causes of conflict in Africa and the Arab world. In these societies, there are enough ‘holy book’ custodians who are the worst of the kind, reprehensible. I believe religious fundamentalists do the greatest havoc by deliberately bringing God into the scene of their crimes of bloodshed and subversion of justice and fairness in Nigeria. It is akin to invoking the name of the devil before and after committing sacrilegious acts of willful murder and destruction. God cannot be glorified in such actions, but Satan can, because he excels in evil-doing.
The current Nigerian security authorities have not shown discretion by failing to divest themselves of deep biases in handling crimes relating to religion. The judgment is that they turn blind to the abhorrence of Islamic fundamentalists. Regrettably, their officers and men have paid and continue to pay disproportionate prices for this imprudence. The authorities are failing to put differences aside in order to recognize the imperative of forcing some radical and self-styled religious leaders to limit the damage they are inflicting on the Nigerian people through violence and intolerant ideologies. Nigeria is a secular state with diverse culture and religion; therefore, there is a need to maintain constitutional order as a fortification against unnecessary tension and civil strife. Religious radicals must be mindful that Nigeria is neither a theocratic nor mono-religious state and that every Nigerian has the inviolable right to security in places of worship. Security is an organic concept without which nothing works. Security is a condition that must exist for other legitimate activities to take place. The constitutional freedom of every Nigerian includes freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of speech, and freedom of worship.
In some regions of Nigeria, it is not uncommon to notice widespread drug use by youths and a growing expression of terrorism aided by the accessibility of easy-to-use deadly weapons. These weapons facilitate and reinforce the inclination to violence. They are employed with confidence in inflicting injuries on innocent victims and multiplying the agony of indirect victims. By illegally acquiring military-grade weapons, combatant religious fundamentalists or militias obtain the trappings and firepower of a military force, giving them confidence and a sense of invincibility as they invade and execute neighbors for their faith. Harbingers of violence always have enough reasons for destruction. When the reasons dry up, they quickly invent one, so long as there is an abundant supply of bullets.
Ref. Roots of conflict p3
⦁ Lebanon:ASyrianHandinpoliticalinstabilityMay21,2007@Stratfor’sFreeIntelligentReports@stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id
⦁ Ibid
⦁ Ibid
⦁ Ibid
⦁ Ibid
⦁ Ibid
⦁ Ibid
⦁ Ibid
⦁ Ibid
⦁ See Ekaterina Stepanova in SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press
⦁ Ibid
⦁ See David M. Walker (2008) in US Government Accountability Office ‘Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, a report to the US senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 4 2007 in Ekaterina S. op.cit.
⦁ See Ekaterina Stepanova op.cit.